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Those who embark on an account of cosmopolitan justice have to navigate 
their way past more than one set of hazards. They have to eschew idealised 
accounts of justice that have no bearing on the world as it actually is, but at 
the same time avoid a theory which makes too many accommodations to 
present states of affairs. They have to show how a morality that centres on 
individuals and their equal entitlements can be realized in a world where 
nationalist motivations predominant and nation-states remain the principal 
agents. They have to explain how just global governance is possible short of 
establishing a world government – which almost no one wants or thinks is 
possible. Gillian Brock is well aware of these hazards and her book, more 
successfully than most recent literature on global justice, makes a concerted 
effort to avoid them. 
Her book advances the discussion of global justice in a number of ways. It 
puts forward a plausible view of what those concerned with global justice 
should be aiming for. It contains insightful criticisms of the views of those 
who have written on the subject. But its most important contribution is that 
it explores the ways in which a conception of global justice could be realized 
in the world as it is or could become. Her accomplishment is to show how 
moral cosmopolitanism can be combined with a concern for the creation and 
operation of effective and just global institutions. Other theorists and 
reformers may have different ideas about how this should be done. But the 
pragmatic turn that Brock’s work represents is welcome and necessary.  
Her conception of global justice is derived from a thought experiment. 
Imagine that you are a randomly selected delegate to a global convention 
with the aim of determining ‘what would be a fair framework for interactions 
and relations among the world’s inhabitants’ (49). Since you are behind a veil 
of ignorance you do not know what position you will occupy when the veil is 
lifted, what country you come from or even what generation you belong to. 
You do however know relevant facts about global problems. Brock does not 
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think that the requirements of justice that you and the other delegates agree 
to will include an egalitarian principle of distributive justice like Rawls’s 
difference principle. Instead the delegates will favour social and political 
arrangements that ensure that every individual is able to meet his or her 
basic needs and enjoys a reasonable range of opportunities. She thinks that 
this result is backed up by the experimental work done by Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer showing that groups who are asked to choose a conception of 
justice for their society generally favour one that ensures that everyone is 
able to meet their needs but does not put limits on inequalities that can result 
from ability or fortune.  
This thought experiment raises a number of questions. In Brock’s version 
of the original position what is up for grabs are not only principles of justice 
for global society, but also the very existence and nature of this society, the 
institutions it ought to contain and the way people ought to cooperate. It is 
not so easy to see how an agreement about global justice is possible when 
different institutional frameworks might result in different conceptions of 
justice. For example, people who think that global institutions similar to 
those that now exist in liberal democracies are possible and desirable might 
favour a more demanding conception of global justice. Those who think that 
sovereign states should continue to be the principal agents of world society 
would probably not.  
An appeal to Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s attempts to simulate Rawls’s 
original position cannot be a decisive reason for favouring the result that 
Brock reaches. The experimental groups, no doubt influenced by the ideology 
of their own societies, could not be expected to realize Rawls’s requirement of 
rationality in the limited time that they had to debate the issues. Did their 
widespread indifference to social inequality stem from a belief in the highly 
debatable notion that the rich deserve their good fortune? Or did it rest on 
the equally contentious idea that large incentives are needed to encourage 
productivity? Did those who participated in the experiment sufficiently 
consider the social problems caused by inequality or the fact that inequalities 
tend to be perpetuated through the generations?  
Despite doubts about Brock’s starting point, there are good reasons for 
favouring her conclusion: that we ought to aim for a world in which everyone 
is able to live a decent life. Those who support welfare rights or the 
satisfaction of basic needs or the achievement of human capabilities all 
endorse this objective (as she points out). The data from Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer’s experiments at least show that this is an idea that most 
people can be induced to support. And those who favour a more demanding 
idea of global justice will admit that ensuring that everyone is able to satisfy 
their needs is a good first step.  
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So what is the use of Brock’s thought experiment? Is it a troublesome 
device that should be jettisoned? It seems to me that it has one important 
function. It forces people to think as cosmopolitans and thus recognise that 
satisfying basic needs of the world’s people is a priority – not something that 
members of wealthy nations are only obligated to do after they have ensured 
a high standard of welfare for themselves. This is the point that Brock makes 
when she considers what forms of national favouritism are compatible with 
global justice. So understood, her thought experiment is a way of positioning 
a debate about global justice – it does not provide a definite conclusion. 
Thinking as cosmopolitans is compatible with having disagreements about 
what global justice is or what global institutions we should favour.  
However, Brock’s own view about the nature of global justice serves the 
principal aim of her book: to explain how justice for the world’s people can be 
achieved in a reasonably short time without radical changes to global society. 
To use Rawls’s phrase, her aim is to be ‘realistically utopian’. Most of her 
discussion concentrates on how presently existing institutions can be made 
more accountable to all of the world’s people, more effective, and thus more 
just, or how new institutions might overcome some of the obstacles that 
stand in the way of people meeting their needs.  
In one of her best chapters she explains how trained health workers from 
poor countries are recruited, sometimes en masse, to work in developed 
countries, thus depriving people in their homeland of health care and taking 
advantage of the efforts it put into training them. She proposes that the 
codes of practice adopted in the UK – codes that require government to 
government agreements about recruitment – be made more general, that 
developed countries should aim to train their own health workers, and 
meanwhile provide compensation to countries that supply them. Brock 
concentrates on ways in which recruitment of health workers diminishes the 
chances of people in poor countries meeting their health needs. But the 
problem is much more general. Most developed countries now concentrate on 
attracting immigrants with valued skills or with capital. Such policies 
deserve critical attention from the perspective of global justice. 
To provide poor countries with more funds to overcome poverty, she 
proposes that multinationals that operate in their territory pay their fair 
share of taxes, that tax havens be abolished, that transfer pricing be 
eliminated, and that proposals for taxing world trade, email traffic, use of 
carbon, or international goods for the benefit of poor countries be considered. 
She proposes the creation of an international body, or the extension of the 
powers of existing organizations, to collect and distribute the funds. To deal 
with corrupt governments who exploit and abuse their own people she 
proposes measures that will protect liberty – above all, freedom of the press, 
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which can be promoted by internal and external pressure groups. In the 
worst cases humanitarian intervention may be necessary. Ideally, 
intervention should be decided on and managed by an accountable 
organization dedicated to protecting vital interests of individuals and funds 
should be made available for this purpose and for preventative measures. 
Many other ideas for institutional changes are discussed in her book – all 
with the aim of removing injustices that prevent people from satisfying their 
needs. 
This brief survey shows that there are two kinds of reforms to global 
society that Brock proposes. The first are those that could be brought into 
existence without significant changes to existing international or national 
institutions. To provide compensation to countries that are a source of supply 
for health workers, to impose a resource tax or do away with tax havens, to 
make terms of trade more fair are things that governments could do right 
now if they had the will. The second type of reform requires new institutions: 
for example, to distribute the proceeds of a tax so that it benefits the needy 
or to sanction and control intervention. Such institutions, as she points out, 
must be effective and accountable and she argues that they are more likely to 
be so if they are democratic and truly representative of all the world’s people.  
A sceptic is likely to wonder whether a just world, according to Brock’s 
conception, is really possible. The will to make changes that would favour the 
world’s poor is far from evident in the policies of leaders or the opinions of 
citizens of wealthy democracies. And new world institutions, democratic or 
not, are likely to be as divided by ideological differences and national self-
interests as present institutions. What is needed, it seems to me, is more 
attention to developments that might encourage people to think more like 
the delegates in her thought experiment. Is the development of a global ‘civil 
society’ likely to have this result? And if so, how? Can the internet make a 
contribution, or the growth of non-governmental organizations? Or do we 
need a democratic politics that transcends national borders? 
Brock cannot be expected to solve all the problem of global governance. 
Her book is useful because it opens up space for debates about how global 
problems might be solved. By resisting the tendency of those who talk about 
global justice to concentrate on an ideal conception without considering how 
it might be put into practice, she invites other philosophers to follow her 
example. The aim of her book, as she states it is to allay the worries of the 
sceptics who doubt the very possibility of a just global order as well as the 
concerns of nationalists who fear the power of global institutions. 
Nationalists are likely to worry about the nature and power of the global 
organizations that she recommends. Radicals will accuse her of not 
sufficiently remaking the global order. And, as I have suggested, there is 
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plenty of wiggle room for sceptics. Nevertheless her book is a laudable 
attempt to go beyond these theoretical dead ends and to force philosophers 
and others to engage in a more productive discussion about the possibilities 
for a just global order. 
 
